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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1 Did the Ninth Circuit err by failing to hold that the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 
1996 is a content-neutral regulation aimed at the secondary effects child pornography has 
on the welfare of children?
2. Did the Ninth Circuit err by holding the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad when the language of the statute provides 
adequate notice of what is prohibited and therefore eliminates the risk of suppressing 
protected forms of speech?
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In The
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
October Term, 2001
John Ashcroft, Attorney General, et al.,
Petitioners,
V.
Free Speech Coalition,
Respondents
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
Petitioners, John Ashcroft, Attorney General, et al., respectfully submits this brief and 
requests that this Court REVERSE the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit on the constitutionality of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reported at 198 
F.3d 1083 (9th Cir 1999).
1
STANDARD OF REVIEW
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
preliminary Statement
On January 27, 1997, the Free Speech Coalition (“FSC”) filed a compliant in the 
Northern District of California. (Joint Appendix (“J.A.") 1.) The FSC contended that the Child 
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (“CPPA”) is unconstitutional as a result of its alleged 
infringement of First and Fifth Amendment rights. (J.A. 2.) The Complaint sought a pre­
enforcement injunction and declaratory relief to allow the continued production, distribution, and 
presentation of the sexually explicit materials proscribed by the CPPA. (J.A. 9.) Both parties 
filed cross motions for summary judgment. (J.A 14, 16.) On August 12, 1997, the district court 
ruled that the CPPA satisfies constitutional standards and is therefore constitutional as written. 
Free Speech Coalition Janet Reno, 1997 U.S Dist. LEXIS 12212 (N D CA. Aug. 12, 1997). 
Thereafter, FSC appealed the district court’s adverse ruling. (J.A. 87.) On December 17, 1999, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling on the 
constitutionality of the statutory language of the CPPA. Free Speech Coalition v. Janet Rpnr.
198 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999). This Court granted certiorari on January 22, 2001 John 
Ashcroft, Attorney General v The Free Speech CoaHtion I21 S. Ct. 876 (2001).
This Court reviews the constitutionality of federal statutes de novo Elder v Holloway^
510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994)
Statement of Fact.s
For over twenty years, Congress has attempted to prevent the exploitation of children by
eradicating the highly profitable and highly organized market for child pornography and
prostitution. Free Speech, 198F.3dat 1087. In 1977, Congress recognized child pornography as
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The Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 criminalized the use 
of a minor in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depictions of such 
conduct. Id at 1087. Due to shortcomings in the ability to convict under this act, as well as this 
Court’s ruling in New York v. Ferber. 458 U.S. 747 (1982), Congress enacted the Child 
Protection Act of 1984 The Child Protection Act dispensed with the requirement that the 
prohibited material be considered obscene and also raised the age limit for protecting children 
involved in production of child pornography from sixteen years to eighteen years of age. Free 
Speech, 198 F 3d at 1088 Congress intended to make it clear that the depiction of children 
engaged in sexual activity was unlawful even if it did not meet the adult obscenity standard. Id
Technological advancements resulted in the Child Protection and Enforcement Act of 
1988. Id This law criminalized the use of a computer to transport, distribute, or receive child 
pornography Id Following this Court’s decision in Osborne v. Ohio. 495 U.S. 103 (1990), 
Congress amended this law to punish the production or importation of sexually explicit 
depictions of minors and mandated restitution for victims of child pornography The purpose of 
this statute was to protect real children from exploitation. Free Speech 198 F 3d at 1088. 
However, due to sweeping advances in computer technology, the sanctity of childhood 
innocence became susceptible to corruption in the form of virtual pornography. In 1996, 
Congress continued the effort to stop “kiddie porn,” by passing the CPPA. Id at 1089. The
a grave social concern and passed the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act,
the first in a series of laws aimed at stopping child pornography and exploitation. Free Speech,
198 F.3d at 1087. Congress amended this law periodically to combat the resolve and elusive
nature of child pornographers, and to tailor the law within the decisions by this Court regarding
child pornography Id at 1087-1089.
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CPPA expanded the existing law to combat the use of computer technology to produce 
pornography containing images that resemble children. Free Speech I98F,3dat 1089. The 
goal of the CPPA is to protect children by preventing the use of sexually explicit computer 
images to entice actual children to engage in degrading acts, as well as to stifle the impetus of 
pedophiles and sexual perverts who would otherwise be encouraged by the availability of such 
reprehensible materials. Id at 1089.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The CPPA’s language and purpose constitutionally permits the government to regulate 
both real and virtual child pornography. The statute ensures that young children will not be 
exploited through child pornography nor become victims of sexual abuse at the hands of 
pedophiles and child molesters. By only targeting the secondary effects of child pornography on 
society, and providing alternative means of expressing child sexuality, the statute preserves the 
free flow of information into the marketplace of ideas. As such, the CPPA is a content-neutral 
statute because it serves a substantial state interest and is justified without reference to the 
content of the speech. Even if the CPPA is considered to be a content-based restriction on 
speech, it survives strict scrutiny. It is a narrowly tailored statute that serves the compelling 
interests of the state in protecting children.
There is no reason to strike down the CPPA as unconstitutionally vague The language of
the statute provides the ordinary viewer of sexually explicit material adequate notice of the kinds
of images to avoid. In addition, the interaction of the applicable legal standards provides further
safeguards to the average person viewing suspect images. The legal standards, specifically, the
precise definitions of terms in the statute, the scienter requirement, and the affirmative defense.
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The C PPA’s criminalization of the transport and possession of artificial or “virtual” child 
pornography is not an overbroad and unconstitutional reach by Congress. This Court has 
sanctioned congressional efforts to contain the evil of child pornography not just because of its 
impact on specific, identifiable “real” children, but also for the equally compelling objective of 
eliminating the child pornography trade in general. The Ninth Circuit erred by disregarding 
congressional findings that were made to justify the passage of the CPPA in order to reach the 
conclusion that the latter objective is overwhelmed by First Amendment concerns. The Ninth 
Circuit impermissibly ignored its duty to give substantial deference to Congress’ findings, which 
support the notion that virtual child pornography, even though it may not involve the use of 
actual children, is intended to prevent harm to actual children. The government’s interest in 
addressing these forms of child pornography is no less powerful than in instances where an 
actual child is used and abused during the production process. The existence of a tiny fraction of 
material that could conceivably qualify for First Amendment protection but that could fall under 
the purview of the CPPA does not render the statute as a whole substantially overbroad.
ARGUMENT
I THE CPPA IS A CONTENT-NEUTRAL STATUTE THAT AUTHORIZES THE 
REGULATION OF BOTH REAL AND VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
BECAUSE IT SERVES COMPELLING GOVERNMENT INTERESTS BY 
TARGETING THE HARMFUL SECONDARY EFFECTS OF CHILD 
PORNOGRAPHY
The government can impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of 
protected speech, so long as the regulation is justified without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech, is designed to serve a substantial government interest, and does not
all work in concert to minimize the danger that the CPPA might be enforced in an arbitrary or
discriminatory fashion by overzealous police officers or prosecutors.
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unreasonably limit alternative methods of communication. City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 
Inc., 475 U.S 41, 47 (1986) (emphasis added). In Renton, this Court held a regulation 
prohibiting the location of adult theaters to be content-neutral because it did not ban adult 
theaters altogether, but merely sought to combat the harmful secondary effects of such theaters 
on the local community. Renton, 475 U.S. at 46-48. Similarly, the CPPA is content-neutral 
because it combats the dangerous secondary effects of child pornography on this nation’s 
children while allowing ample alternative forms of expression. Thus, the first step in the 
analysis is to determine if the purpose of the regulation is justified without reference to the 
content of the speech and principally aimed at the secondary effects of speech. Id at 48.
A. The CPPA Advances Compellina Government Interests in Reaulatina the
Secondan/ Effects of Child Pornography On Actual Children.
In Ferber. three principal considerations led this Court to conclude that the government 
has a compelling interest in regulating child pornography: (1) the government’s interest in 
"safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor;” (2) the "distribution of 
photographs and films depicting sexual activity by juveniles is intrinsically related to sexual 
abuse of children;” and (3) the value of permitting material of "children engaged in lewd sexual 
conduct is exceedingly modest, if not de minimis'' 458 U.S. at 764-765. Based on these 
considerations, this Court held child pornography to be a distinct category of expression that 
lacks First Amendment protection whether it is obscene or merely indecent. Id at 757-762. 
Consequently, the material covered by the CPPA is unprotected speech.
The considerations that led the Court to hold that child pornography involving actual 
children is unprotected, are readily applicable to virtual depictions of child pornography that are 
"virtually indistinguishable to the unsuspecting viewer” from actual children engaged in child 
pornography, (J.A. 25.) The CPPA effectively serves five compelling government interests
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I Congress has a compelling interest in preventing children from sexual 
exploitation.
One of Congress’ underlying reasons for enacting the CPPA was to counter the 
secondary effects child pornography has on viewers. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at § III (Aug 2, 1996) 
Congress found that “child pornography is often used as a part of a method of seducing other 
children into sexual activity.” (J.A. 25.) Child pornography degrades and exploits the weakest 
and most vulnerable members of society - our children Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at § IV(A).
Congress noted that “synthetic pornography” stimulates the same anti-social responses as 
“traditional” child pornography and, therefore, can be used as an effective weapon by pedophiles 
to seduce children. (J.A. 25.) This Court explicitly recognized in Osborne that a state has a valid 
interest in preventing pedophiles from using child pornography to seduce children. 495 U S. at 
111. Citing the Attorney General’s Report, this Court found that a “child who is reluctant to 
engage in sexual activity with an adult . can sometimes be convinced by viewing other 
children having ‘fim’ participating in the activity.” id, at 111 n. 7 Furthermore, an adult does 
not have a First Amendment right to display child pornography to children In Ferber. this Court 
noted that the First Amendment does not "extend its immunity to speech or writing used as an 
integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.” 458 U S. at 761-762 (citing 
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co . 336 U S. 490, 498 (1949)). Thus, the First Amendment 
does not protect child pornography that is used by pedophiles or child molesters Therefore, the
stemming from the secondary effects of child pornography; (1) to prevent the seduction of
children through the use of child pornography; (2) to eliminate material that pedophiles and child
molesters can use to whet their appetites, (3) to prevent sexual abuse of children in the
production of child pornography; (4) to extinguish the market for child pornography; and (5) to
protect the psychological well being of children
7
government has a compelling interest in regulating virtual child pornography and keeping it out 
of the hands of sexual predators because the danger to children is as great with “synthetic” 
pornography as it is with “traditional” pornography.
2. Congress has a compelling interest in eliminating materials used by sexual 
predators to whet their sexual appetites.
To combat child pornography, the government is justified in prohibiting the personal 
viewing of child pornography. Osborne. 495 U.S at 110. Congress realized that synthetic child 
pornography that is virtually indistinguishable from real child pornography, could be used to 
encourage child molestation and pedophilia by “whet[ting] [the sexual molester’s] own sexual 
appetite.” (J.A. 25.) Testimony before Congress confirmed that any kind of child pornography 
“can act as an incitement to imitate [sexual molestation] in real life with someone they have 
access to and can intimidate not to tell.” Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at § 1V(A). Pedophiles and child 
molesters use child pornography as a “training manual” in acquiring their own deviation. Id^ 
Such uses of child pornography desensitize the viewer to the harm of sexual abuse or child 
exploitation so that it becomes acceptable to the viewer or even preferred (J.A. 25.) Therefore, 
virtual and real child pornography encourages the activities of child molesters and pedophiles 
and plays a critical role in the vicious cycle of child sexual abuse and exploitation. Sen. Rpt. 
104-358, at 1V(A). Thus, the CPPA is necessary to safeguard the physical and psychological 
well-being of children. The CPPA addresses a compelling government interest in curbing and 
preventing the viewing of child pornography by pedophiles and child molesters, who use child 
pornography to whet their sexual appetites.
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^ Conaress has a compelline interest in preventing the sexual abuse of 
minors involved in the production of child pornography
By altering a photograph to make it impossible to show that a real child was ever 
involved in its creation, virtual child pornography allows child pornographers to hide the sexual 
abuse of a child. United States v, Hilton. 167 F.3d61.73nst Cir. 1999^ In Hilton, the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals found that without the “appears to be” language in the CPPA, real child 
pornographers could hide behind the inaccurate presumption that real children were not used in 
the production ot child pornography, and thus effectively frustrate the government’s efforts to 
prevent the sexual exploitation of real children. Id Because computers can create images that 
are virtually indistinguishable from images of real children, a defendant charged with producing, 
distributing, or possessing child pornography could argue that the government failed to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that actual children were used. Id Without the “appears to be” 
language in the CPPA, a substantial loophole in the prohibitions on child pornography using 
actual children would be created; a loophole that basically handicaps law enforcement in their 
mission to protect children from sexual abuse. Id; United States v. Mento. 231 F.3d 912, 920 
(4th Cir, 2000) (the court noted that technological advances have created an enforcement 
problem when all that can be proved is that the actor “appears to be” that of a minor). Preventing 
the disguised sexual abuse of children is a compelling government interest that is directly related 
to the rationale espoused in Ferber for protecting children from sexual abuse.
4 Congress has a compelling interest in drying up the child pornotJraphv 
market.
Congress’ findings follow this Court’s holding in Osborne: that prohibiting virtual child 
pornography would encourage owners of all child pornography to destroy those materials. See 
495 U.S. at 111. It is reasonable to conclude that penalizing possession will encourage the
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destruction of child pornography, and thus will decrease demand for the product and thereby 
“dry up the market” for child pornography. Osborne. 495 U.S. at 109-110. This Court 
recognized that in order to combat child pornography, “the government is justified in not only 
driving it from the marketplace, but prohibiting the possession and personal viewing of these 
materials.” Id at 110. In fact, in Ferber, this Court recognized that the dissemination of child 
pornography provides an economic motive to continue the production of child pornography. 
Feite, 458 U.S, at 761. By removing virtual child pornography as a defense to possessing and 
viewing child pornography, the CPPA simultaneously decreases the demand and eliminates the 
supply of child pornography. Also, the interest in eliminating the child pornography market both 
aids in protecting children from sexual exploitation and eliminates material that is concededly 
trivial in nature, id
^ Congress has a compelling interest in protecting the psychological well 
being of children
A computer image that includes a recognizable feature of a minor, such as a minor’s face, 
is intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children.” Id at 759. A computer picture that 
includes an image of a recognizable minor invades that minor’s “privacy and reputational 
interests and can “haunt the minor for years to come.” (J.A. 25.) The Congressional finding 
mirrors the reasoning this Court applied in Ferber to find that the government has a compelling 
interest in regulating child pornography. See 458 U.S. at 759-760. There can be no doubt that a 
child viewing a computer generated image of herself engaged in sexually explicit activity would 
be psychologically harmed by the viewing of the picture. Knowledge that the picture is 
circulating over the Internet, or in her community, would compound the psychological damage. 
Even if the pictures are fictional, they have the appearance of reality and thus violate the minor’s 
privacy interests. Therefore, prohibiting virtual child pornography, like real child pornography.
10
is necessary to further the government’s compelling interest to protect the psychological well­
being of children from the insidious effects child pornography has on those who view it. Ferber 
458 U.S. at 759-760.
The harm caused by virtual child pornography, or visual depictions that are virtually
indistinguishable to the unsuspecting viewer from unretouched photographic images of actual
children engaging in sexually explicit conduct, outweighs the competing interests of expressive
conduct. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764. As this Court in Renton proscribed the location of adult
theaters to protect the local communities from their harmful effects, the CPPA performs an
analogous function with regard to child pornography. The CPPA proscribes child pornography
to protect this nation’s children from sexual abuse, sexual predators, the child pornography
market, and its detrimental effects on a child’s psychology. While the harm to children is great,
the value of child pornography is “exceedingly modest, if not de minimis " Id at 762.
Consequently, the language of the CPPA targets the harmful secondary effects flowing from the
existence and availability of child pornography, rather than the individual ideas contained in
those images. As such, it prevents sexual exploitation and child abuse, and reaffirms the basic
considerations that led this Court to declare child pornography unconstitutional.
Under Ferber, the CPPA Constitutionally Authorizes the Regulation of Sexually 
Explicit Imaaes That Do Not Contain Actual Children.
The Ninth Circuit erred by holding that Congress has “no compelling interest in 
regulating sexually explicit materials that do not contain visual images of actual children.” Free 
Speech, 198 F.3d at 1092. The Ninth Circuit based part of its decision on the statement in Ferber 
that “if it were necessary for literary or artistic value, a person over the statutory age who 
perhaps looked younger could be utilized,” 458 U.S. at 763. Also, the Ninth Circuit relied on 
the statement in Ferber that the government’s interest is “limited to works that visually depict
II
children below a specified age.” 458 U S. at 764. Neither statement relegates the government’s 
interest to visual depictions involving actual minors.
The first statement only describes one option available to people under the New York 
statute at issue in Ferber. This statement is not a holding that the First Amendment protects 
images that are virtually indistinguishable from images of real children engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct. The second statement fails to draw a distinction between real children and 
pictures of persons who appear to be real children Thus, Ferber does not limit the government’s 
interest to regulating only those sexually explicit materials that contain images of actual children.
The Ninth Circuit also erred by concluding that there is no “nexus” between the harm to 
real children and computer-generated images. Free Speech. 198 F.3d at 1093-1094. As the Free 
Speech dissent notes, before enacting the CPPA, Congress went through “thirteen detailed 
legislative findings [and personal testimony] that explain[ed] why virtual child pornography 
needs to be prohibited.” Id at 1099. In addition, a substantial amount of evidence from 
researchers and prosecutors that testified before the Senate Hearings informed Congress of the 
deleterious effects of virtual child pornography. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at § IV. These 
Congressional findings establish the link between virtual child pornography and harm to children 
and should be afforded deference in this determination.
Congressional findings regarding the effects of child pornography on those who view it 
are entitled to deference Turner Broadcasting System, Inc, v, F C C.. 512 U S. 622, 655 (1994), 
In the First Amendment realm. Congressional deference is given because Congress “is far better 
equipped than the judiciary to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing upon 
legislative questions” and out “of respect for [Congress’] authority to exercise the legislative 
power.” Id at 655-666
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As stated, Congress compiled detailed findings on the effects of virtual child 
pornography on children before enacting the CPPA. This Court should give deference to the 
Congressional findings and find that they create a causal link between virtual child pornography 
and harm to children. Also, the statements from Ferber that the Ninth Circuit relied on in its 
decision, do not proscribe the regulation of the CPPA to sexually explicit depictions of actual 
children. Therefore, it would be inaccurate to characterize this Court’s decision in Ferber as 
limiting the CPPA’s reach to effects on actual children, and to limit Congress’ power to enact 
legislation to combat virtual child pornography.
Furthermore, it would be a mistake to attempt to resolve the question of whether the 
CPPA can regulate virtual child pornography by picking out isolated sentences in an opinion that 
were addressed to a different question. Two judicial maxims of the federal courts are: (1) never 
decide a constitutional question in advance of the necessity of deciding it, and (2) never 
formulate a rule of law broader than required by the facts before the court. Ferber. 458 U.S. at 
768 n. 20 (citing United States v. Raines. 362 U.S. 17,21(1960)). In Ferber. the facts before 
this Court involved only real children The technology to create virtual child pornography was 
not available at the time this Court ruled in Ferber. Thus, the constitutionality of virtual child 
pornography was not before this Court in Ferber. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to use the 
holding in Ferber to declare that the CPPA’s prohibition on virtual child pornography violates 
the First Amendment. The crucial part of this Court’s decision in Ferber. is the analysis this 
Court applied to determine that child pornography is unconstitutional. As demonstrated, the 
analysis in Ferber. is equally applicable here. Thus, virtual child pornography is likewise 
unprotected by the First Amendment and Congress can constitutionally regulate such images.
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C. The CPPA is Narrowly Tailored to Serve A Compelling Government Interest.
When a regulation rests on substantial governmental interests, the next issue is whether 
the statute is narrowly tailored to serve the government’s compelling, content-neutral interests. 
Ward V. Rock Asainst Racism. 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989). The CPPA “need not be the least 
restrictive or least intrusive means” of serving the government’s interest. Id at 798. A statute is 
narrowly tailored “so long as the . . . substantia! government interest . . . would be achieved less 
effectively absent the regulation.” Id at 799. Furthermore, a regulation will be sustained under 
the First Amendment so long as it “does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to 
further those [governmental] interests.” Turner Broadcasting. 512 U S at 634 Moreover, the 
government is generally afforded greater leeway in regulating pornographic depictions of 
children. Ferber. 458 U.S. at 756.
Here, the CPPA clearly advances the government’s strong interest in preventing the 
harms caused by child pornography and the child pornography industry The government 
directly advances these interests by narrowing the range of prescribable material to visual 
depictions that are, or appear to be, children engaged in sexual activity. United States v.
Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 650 (11th Cir. 1999). In Acheson, the circuit court reviewed the CPPA 
and found it to be narrowly tailored to accomplish its objective. Id at 649-652. The circuit court 
noted that the CPPA only prohibits those images that appear to be of children engaged in 
sexually explicit conduct as specifically defined by the statute. Id at 651. The CPPA describes 
“sexually explicit” conduct to include: “actual or simulated intercourse, oral sex, anal sex, 
homosexual or heterosexual sex, bestiality, masturbation, sadistic or masochistic abuse, and 
lavicious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area.” 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2) Therefore, the types of
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images regulated are only those that are virtually indistinguishable from the current types of 
child pornography found today.
The CPPA further narrows its focus by adequately defining “child pornography” as any
visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct where:
[t]he production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor . . . or 
appears to be, a minor ... or, such a visual depiction is advertised, promoted, 
presented, described, or distributed [in such a way as to] convey the impression 
that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct.
18 U.S.C. 2256(8). The circuit court noted that any ambiguity within the definitions regarding 
whether the depicted person is a minor is resolved through objective proof such as physical 
characteristics, Acheson. 195F.3dat 653 Where physical characteristics leave room for doubt, 
a person can be fairly warned by examining whether the work was marketed or advertised as 
child pornography. Id This ambiguity is not detrimental to the constitutionality of the CPPA.
In Ferber. the court acknowledge that certain forms of protected speech (i.e. National 
Geographic) might be affected by the New York statute in that case. 458 U.S. at 767. Also, in 
Osborne, the court noted that the Ohio statute on its face seemed to prohibit “nude” pictures of 
minors, and was less narrowly tailored than the statute ruled on in Ferber. 495 U.S. at 114-115. 
This Court still held that such ambiguity in the language did not render it invalid. Id Thus, both 
Ferber and Osborne support the proposition that when the government regulates child 
pornography the statute need not be the most narrowly tailored or the least restrictive means to 
achieve that interest.
Therefore, the CPPA is a narrowly tailored statute that directly and materially advances 
compelling government interests in regulating the exploitive effects of child pornography. The 
CPPA concisely describes the narrow range of images of children engaging in sexually explicit
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conduct it seeks to prohibit. Thus, the CPPA furthers the government’s compelling interest in 
protecting children from sexual abuse and exploitation without placing unreasonable restrictions 
on other forms of speech protected under the First Amendment.
D. The CPPA Allows Ample Alternative Channels of Communication.
Finally, a narrowly tailored statute that advances substantial government interests must 
provide for alternative channels of communication for it to be considered a constitutional 
content-neutral statute. Renton. 457 U S. at 47-48. The CPPA allows ample alternative channels 
of communication through the language of the statute and through an affirmative defense. 18 
u s e. § 2252A(c). The statute only criminalizes a narrow segment of visual depictions of 
children engaged in sexual activity. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2). The CPPA provides an affirmative 
defense to persons, like the Respondents, who distribute and produce adult pornography with 
people that look like children, as long as they do not “advertise, promote, present, describe, or 
distribute the material in such a manner as to convey the impression that it is or contains a visual 
depiction of a minor engaged in sexual activity” 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c). Thus, protected speech, 
such as that which the Respondents claim to produce and distribute, is completely free from 
prosecution or restraint. Accordingly, the statute provides alternative channels for people to 
communicate their ideas.
Furthermore, the language of the CPPA allows for the production of literary, scientific, or 
educational works that find it necessary to depict children engaged in sexual conduct. The 
statute defines an “identifiable minor” to mean an actual minor or one so readily identifiable as 
an actual minor that the picture would have a recognizable feature, such as a birthmark. 18 
U.S.C. § 2256(9)(ii). Since these types of features would only apply to a visual depiction that is
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virtually indistinguishable from photographs of real children, it would not apply to drawings, 
cartoons, sculptures, or paintings that depict youthful-looking people in sexual poses.
Also, the CPPA does not ban the dissemination of a particular expressive idea regarding 
the sexuality of children; it only prohibits the use and production of hard-core child pornography 
Ferber, 458 U S at 763 Consequently, the CPPA does not apply to visual depictions in which 
sexually explicit conduct between children is taking place, so long as the visual depiction of the 
explicit sexual conduct is not shown. Therefore, what the CPPA really prohibits is speech that is 
generally without First Amendment protection, or speech whose value is “exceedingly modest, if 
not <Je minimis.'' Id at 757
Accordingly, the incidental harms on the speech are outweighed by the government’s
interest in regulating child pornography Therefore, the CPPA must be found to be a content-
neutral regulation because it seeks to prohibit a particular practice, not because of its expressive
value, but due to its harmful secondary efiFects. Furthermore, the CPPA is narrowly tailored to
further the government’s interests while permitting ample alternative means of communication.
II EVEN IF THE CPPA IS CONSIDERED A CONTENT-BASED REGULATION, IT 
SURVIVES STRICT SCRUTINY BECAUSE IT IS NARROWLY TAILORED TO 
SERVE A COMPELLING GOVERNMENT INTEREST.
A regulation that restricts speech based on its content is ordinarily subject to strict
scrutiny and may be upheld only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government
interest. Boos v. Barry. 485 U S. 312, 321 (1988). It is understood, though, that the “right to
free speech is not absolute at ail times and under all circumstances.” Chaplinskv v. New
Hampshire, 315 U S 568, 571 (1942). Furthermore, there are “certain well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been
thought to raise any Constitution[al] problem [such as] lewd and obscene [utterances].”
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A. The Government Has Compelling Interests in Regulating Child PornoRraphy 
When determining whether a content-based statute is constitutional, the statute must be 
found to address compelling government interests. Boos, 485 U.S. at 321. The Ninth Circuit 
below held that the CPPA could not justify the government’s compelling interests because 
Ferber required (he statute address harm to real, not virtual, children. Free Speech. 198 F.3d at 
1091-1095. The analysis in the preceding sections demonstrates that the Ninth Circuit erred in 
holding that the government has no compelling interest in regulating virtual child pornography.
supra part 1(A), (B), (C). What remains consistent between the Ninth Circuit’s analysis and 
the argument presented here is that the regulation and elimination of child pornography is a 
compelling government interest. See Free Speech. 198 F.3d at 1091. Therefore, the only 
question is whether the CPPA is more extensive than necessary to serve that interest
B. The CPPA is Narrowly Tailored to Advance Compelling Government Interests. 
To pass constitutional scrutiny, a particular anti-child pornography statute must be 
“adequately defined ” Hilton. 167 F.3d at 69 (citing Ferber. 458 U S. at 764) As stated, the 
CPPA’s narrow definitions of sexually explicit conduct and child pornography focus the statute 
on an exceedingly narrow range of images. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2256(2), (8) Furthermore, the 
CPPA’s definition of an identifiable minor is so narrow that any attempt to further specify it 
would render the statute unreasonable and impracticable to enforce. Any ambiguity in the
Chaplinskv. 315 U S. at 571-572 (footnote omitted). The social benefit of such speech is of
such slight value as to be clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. Id at
572. Real and virtual child pornography is a certain form of expression, the prohibition and
punishment of which, should not raise any constitutional concerns, since the value of such
speech is de minimis Ferber. 458 U.S. at 762.
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contested sections of the CPPA is resolved by examining the physical characteristics of the child
image used in the pornography, and the manner in which the image is described, displayed, or
advertised. supra part 1(C). Therefore, Congress intended the language “appears to be” and
“conveys the impression” to reach a narrow range of depictions that are “virtually
indistinguishable to the unsuspecting viewer from unretouched photographic images of actual
children engaged is sexually explicit conduct.” (J.A. 25.) Accordingly, the challenged
provisions of the CPPA are constitutional even if they trigger strict scrutiny, because they are
narrowly tailored to protect children from sexual exploitation. Furthermore, as demonstrated,
there are no less restrictive means of advancing the government’s compelling interest in
protecting children from sexual abuse and exploitation. See supra part 1(C). Therefore, even if
the CPPA is considered a content-based statute it survives strict First Amendment scrutiny.
Ill THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY HOLDING THE CPPA
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AND OVERBROAD BECAUSE THE 
LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE PROVIDES ADEQUATE NOTICE OF WHAT IS 
PROHIBITED AND THEREFORE ELIMINATES THE RISK OF SUPPRESSING 
PROTECTED FORMS OF SPEECH
The void for vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are closely related because an 
imprecise law may capture protected conduct at its edges. Village of Hoffman Est. v. Flipside, 
455 U.S. 489, 495 (1982). Where the challenged provision “abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic 
First Amendment freedoms, it operates to inhibit the exercise of those freedoms” and 
understandably generates cause for concern. Grayned v. City of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104, 109 
(1972). Because liberty is the most exalted of American ideals, restrictions on liberty must be 
spelled out with sufficient clarity to put citizens on notice of what conduct is prohibited and with 
enough definiteness to limit arbitrary law enforcement. Koleanderv. Lawson. 461 U.S. 352, 357 
(1983). In the instant case, the CPPA easily surmounts the obstacle of vagueness because the
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statute itself defines the criminal offense with enough certainty to put a reasonable person on 
notice that possessing images appearing to be children engaged in sexually explicit conduct is 
illegal- In addition, the affirmative defense and scienter requirements included in the statute are 
significant procedural safeguards against improper enforcement of the law.
The overbreadth doctrine allows a litigant to challenge a statute’s possible direct and 
indirect burdens on speech. American Booksellers v. Webb, 919 F.2d 1493, 1499-1500 (11th 
Cir, 1990). Notwithstanding, there are some First Amendment freedoms that are more sensitive 
than others. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul. 505 US. 377, 383-385 (1992). Simply put, some types 
of speech make up no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and thus may be freely regulated 
because of their constitutionally proscribable content, id Child pornography is an example of 
this type of unprotected speech. Ferber. 458 US. at 763. The overbreadth doctrine is designed 
to protect the public from the chilling effect an overbroad statute has on protected speech, as 
opposed to unprotected speech. Nationalist Movement v. City of Cummins, 934. F.2d 1482,
1485 (11 th Cir, 1991), Also, the overbreadth doctrine requires that a statute’s overbreadth be 
real and substantial in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep. Broadrick v Oklahoma. 
413 U S. 601, 613 (1973). The CPPA undoubtedly captures a broad range of images falling 
squarely within the well-established parameters of constitutionally proscribable child 
pornography ^ Acheson. 195 F.3d at 651 In contrast, sexually explicit images falling close 
to the line separating adult pornography and unprotected child pornography are outside the most 
sensitive areas of speech vital to the free expression of ideas. Id Thus, the range of ostensibly 
protectable images is exceedingly minor compared to the range of easily identifiable and 
constitutionally proscribable conduct under the CPPA. Id The legitimate scope of the CPPA 
therefore far exceeds the risk of impermissible applications and the statute is not overbroad.
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A, The CPPA Is Not Unconstitutionally Vague Because The Statutory Language
Gives a Person of Reasonable Intelligence Sufficient Guidance to Discern
What Is Prohibited.
The Ninth Circuit erred by holding the CPPA unconstitutionally vague. The standard for 
overturning a law on grounds of vagueness turns on whether the statute in question provides a 
constitutionally adequate warning to those whose activities it governs. Koleander. 461 U.S. at 
357. A statute is void for vagueness if it fails to define the criminal offense with sufficient 
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that 
does not encourage arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement, li The language of the CPPA 
prohibits material that “appears to be” or that “conveys the impression” of minors engaged in 
sexual activity. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that this language impermissibly defines the criminal 
offense because any ordinary person attempting to interpret it would be left guessing about what 
is against the law and what is not. However, the CPPA precisely describes the people who may 
not be portrayed and the conduct that may not be depicted. 18 U.S.C. § 2256. Therefore, a 
person attempting to interpret the statute is aided by ample statutory criteria explicitly 
delineating the prohibited images.
1. There is an objective standard to use in evaluating the kev phrases of the
CPPA
The phrase “appears to be a minor” provides the ordinary viewer of sexually explicit 
material adequate notice of what images fall under the purview of the statute. The standard for 
determining what “appears to be” a minor is an objective one, Hilton. 167 F.3d at 75. A jury 
must decide, based on the totality of the circumstances, whether a reasonable unsuspecting 
viewer would consider the depiction to be of an actual individual less than eighteen years of age 
engaging in sexual activity. Hilton. 167 F.3d at 75 (citing Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at § 1V(C)). A 
“minor” is explicitly defined as a person under the age of eighteen years of age. The class of
21
images prohibited by this language is further restricted to “visual depictions” of minors engaged 
in specific acts listed in the CPPA, 18 U.S.C. 2256(8). Thus, the ultimate determination that 
must be made is whether the person charged with violating the statute could have reasonably 
ascertained that the image depicted an individual under the age of eighteen. Objective indicators 
exist to warn an ordinary viewer of sexually explicit material of the apparent age of the person 
depicted.
The physical characteristics of a person in an image are especially indicative of whether 
the person appears to be under eighteen years of age. Acheson, 195 F.3d at 653. Evaluation of 
the physical indicia of maturity necessarily requires the use of a common sense standard. It is 
reasonable to expect a person of ordinary intelligence to possess the wherewithal to distinguish 
between children and adults. The Ninth Circuit incorrectly surmised that a determination of a 
person’s age depends too heavily on subjective measures. In fact, the CPPA places the onus on 
the jury to reach that conclusion, and in so doing does not limit the inquiry to analysis of purely 
subjective matters. Id In making the determination, the jury may of course rely on common 
sense expectations, but also should consider objective evidence such as expert testimony about 
the apparent age of the depicted person and the way in which the depiction itself was labeled. 
Hilton. 167 F.3d at 75. Furthermore, the materials themselves often give some indication of the 
actual ages of the participants. This is true where the file name of a sexually explicit photograph 
reveals that its content is targeted to the preferences of pedophiles. Therefore, it is clear that a 
depicted person’s apparent age may be ascertained by a number of objectively verifiable factors 
available to both primary viewers and juries.
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2 The challenged provisions do not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement and thus do not abridge the liberties of innocent parties.
The interaction between the applicable legal standards provides ample safeguards against 
inappropriate prosecutions under the CPPA. ^ Hilton. 167 F.3d at 76. First, the CPPA offers 
an affirmative defense to its provisions dealing with the production of explicit material made 
with persons of suitable age 18 U S.C § 2252A(c). People responsible for the production, sale, 
or distribution of sexually explicit material can protect themselves from prosecution by 
disclosing the ages of models depicted in their products This provision thus encourages 
producers of sexually explicit adult material to promote their wares as legal, thereby minimizing 
the risk of prosecution for a person possessing protected material. Acheson. 195 F.3d at 651. 
The CPPA makes no attempt to prohibit lawful adult pornography, even if aimed at the interests 
and desires of pedophiles, because depictions produced with adult models and labeled as such 
are clearly beyond the scope of the CPPA.
Secondly, alleged possession offenders derive even greater protection from unscrupulous 
enforcement as a result of the scienter requirement of the CPPA. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(2)(a). The 
statute applies only to a person who “knowingly receives or distributes” or “knowingly 
possesses” child pornography. 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2); (a)(5)(B). In order to obtain a 
conviction, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person knowingly 
possessed images of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct Under the “knowingly” 
requirement, a person must have purposefully acquired the material with the belief that the 
material was of a sexually explicit nature and depicted a person who appears to be a minor.
Thus, a defendant who honestly believes that the individual depicted in the image appears to be 
eighteen years old (and is believed by the jury), or who can show that he knew the image was 
created by having a youthful-looking adult pose for it, must be acquitted, so long as the image
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was not presented or marketed as if it contained a real minor. Hilton. 167 F.3d at 75. This 
determination of a defendant’s knowledge is readily arrived at using any of a number of 
objective indicators already mentioned supra III(A)(1) In addition, these legal standards 
not only provide important procedural safeguards against improper enforcement, but also create 
an incentive for focusing prosecutorial energy on the heart of the child pornography problem the 
pre-pubescent child pornography market. Acheson. 195 F.3d at 552. Because the CPPA 
provides multiple layers of protection against unscrupulous prosecution, FSC’s vagueness 
challenge clearly falls short of establishing that the statute encourages arbitrary or discriminatory 
law enforcement
3. The present wordine of the statute is the most effective and least
restrictive means of conveying the intent of the law without sacrificing the
goals of Congress.
It is well within Congress’ power to regulate pornography of minors of all ages, infancy 
through age of majority Hilton. 167 F 3d at 76 The impetus of the CPPA is the relatively novel 
technology-driven strain of the traditional threat posed by child pornography. In order to cast a 
wide enough net to ensnare the more elusive computerized child pornography, a statute must 
necessarily be flexible enough to meet the challenges created by rapidly evolving technology.
The “appears to be” test is the most efficacious means of doing so. A more precise wording of 
the statute, resulting in a narrower class of prohibited images, would essentially limit Congress’ 
ability to regulate pornography depicting all minors. Defining child pornography to include 
images that “appear to be” minors engaged in sexually explicit activity is necessary to achieve 
the two goals of the CPPA, which are “the elimination of child pornography and the protection 
of children from sexual exploitation.” Pub. L. No. 104-208, § I, 110 Stat. 3009-3027 (1996).
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The “appears to be” test is sufficiently precise to pass constitutional muster and yet 
flexible enough to meet the challenges posed by computerized child pornography. Hilton. 167 
F,3d at 76. The test is an explicit recognition of the fact that new technologies make it possible 
to produce visual depictions of what appear to be children that are virtually indistinguishable 
from unretouched photographic images of actual children. 110 Stat, at 3009-3026. The inherent 
threat posed by such technology is that pedophiles rely on child pornography to seduce their 
victims. Either type of child pornography, virtual or real, becomes a powerful tool in the hands 
of a pedophile who can convince a reluctant child to engage in sexual activity by displaying 
depictions of other children ‘having fun’ participating in sexual acts. The real danger addressed 
by the CPPA is that virtual child pornography will ser\’e this end even more effectively than the 
real thing, due to its ease of production and the unlimited scope of manipulation over the subjects 
depicted. The best way to eliminate this danger is to prohibit the tools of seduction, images of 
children engaged in sexual acts, regardless of the means used in their production: This is 
precisely what Congress achieved by adopting a test for defining child pornography that turns on 
the age or apparent age of the person depicted. Defining child pornography to encompass 
images that “appear to be” of minors engaging in sexually explicit activity is the most effective 
means of protecting children from the risk of sexual exploitation.
The Ninth Circuit’s assumption that the articulation of a legal standard requiring 
evaluation of the appearance of an image renders the test arbitrary or overly subjective is 
misplaced Free Speech. 198 F.3d at 1095 Judges and juries routinely make reasonable 
objective assessments of the impression conveyed by a person’s actions or by how an image 
“appears,” especially in the context of obscenity cases. Ferber. 458 U.S. at 751 (approved 
definition of child pornography banned “simulated” sexual conduct, which in ordinary usage
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means “to have or take the appearance of’), Miller v California. 413 U S. 15, 24 (1973) 
(obscenity depends in part on whether material appeals to prurient interest of average person). 
The language of the CPPA’s provisions “suitably limit” the reach of the CPPA so that a person 
of ordinary intelligence can easily discern what is unlawful conduct. United States v. Pearl 
89 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1246 (N.D. Utah 2000). The statute clearly defines the term “minor.” 18 
U.S.C. § 2256. Like the law evaluated in Ferber, the prohibitions of the CPPA are restricted to 
visual images id. Moreover, the statute describes in great detail the types of sexually explicit 
depictions of children that are forbidden. Id, Consistent with this Court’s statement in Osborne 
such limiting language “avoid[s] penalizing persons for viewing or possessing innocuous 
photographs of naked children.” 495 U.S. at 114 The language chosen by Congress affords an 
ordinary consumer adequate notice of what images to avoid. Moreover, the interaction among 
the applicable legal standards prevents inappropriate enforcement by overzealous police officers 
or prosecutors. Thus, there is no reason to uphold the Ninth Circuit’s determination that the 
language of the CPPA is unconstitutionally vague
B. The Lanuuaue of the CPPA Does Not Capture So Much Constitutionally
Protected Conduct as to Render the Statute Invalid On Grounds of Overbreadth
The CPPA does not pose substantial problems of overbreadth sufficient to justify 
overturning the judgment of Congress. Hilton. 167 F.3d at 71, A statute will not be invalidated 
as overbroad unless its overbreadth is real and substantial, judged in relation to the statute’s 
plainly legitimate sweep Osborne. 495 U S. at 112. The overbreadth doctrine should be utilized 
to strike down a statute on its face only as a last resort. Ferber. 458 U.S. at 769. The Ninth 
Circuit apparently disregarded the admonitions of this line of precedent in according undue 
weight to the few arguably problematic prosecutions that could occur under the law, as opposed 
to the greater number of legitimate applications of the CPPA.
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1, The CPPA does not prohibit non-obscene sexual expression that deserves 
First Amendment protection.
Some categories of child pornography. like obscenity, are unprotected by the First 
Amendment Ferber, 458 U.S, at 764, As such, any legislation attempting to regulate child 
pornography must adequately define the prohibited conduct. Id, The CPPA adequately defines 
the class of images it seeks to prohibit As in Ferber. the harm combated by the CPPA is limited 
to harm engendered by works that visually depict sexual conduct by children below a specified 
age. The categories of''sexual conduct” are suitably limited and described. 18 U.S.C.
^ 2256(2). The distinction that the New York statute at issue in Ferber only contemplated harm 
to ‘Teal” children used in production of child pornography, while the CPPA attempts to preempt 
harm to children susceptible to such abuse does not undermine the application of Ferber in 
interpreting the CPPA This distinction between the primary and secondary effects of child 
pornography on our nation’s children illustrates the logical extension of child pornography 
regulation in the technology age. It does not, however, transform virtual child pornography 
into meaningful speech and thereby remove it from the class of conduct deemed unworthy of 
constitutional protection in Ferber,
The new language of the CPPA was intended to target only a narrow class of images, 
visual depictions that are virtually indistinguishable from photographs of actual children 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct. Hilton, 167 F.3d at 68 (citing Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 
n§ 1V(B)). It is clear from the legislative record that the phrase "appears to be” was employed 
to extend the prohibition against child pornography from actual photographic images of minors 
to the identical type of depiction, images that are virtually indistinguishable from the already 
banned depictions, and no further. Id, Therefore, it was Congress’ intent to only extend federal 
authority in a limited fashion to a limited subset of visual images, id. Drawings, cartoons, and
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paintings depicting youthful persons in sexually explicit poses plainly lie beyond the reach of 
the CPPA because by their very nature they are not virtually indistinguishable from images of 
actual minors. Hilton. 167 F.3d at 68 By the same token, the CPPA does not criminalize adult 
pornography created with models over the age of majority who look youthful. Congress 
expressed the general view that the CPPA does not apply to a depiction produced using adults 
engaging in sexual conduct, even where a depicted individual may appear to be a minor. Sen.
Rpt. 104-358, at § IV(C). That view is wholly consistent with this Court s statement in Ferber, 
where the Court presumed that if a depiction of children performing sexual acts might be 
necessary for literary or artistic reasons, “a person over the statutory age who perhaps looked 
younger could be utilized.” 458 U S. at 763. Therefore, the CPPA clearly poses no threat to the 
vast majority of artistic expression involving sexual themes, and there is no risk of a chilling 
effect on the communication of lawful ideas
2. The likely number of lawful applications of the CPPA far outweighs the 
few arguably problematic prosecutions under the law.
It is inefficient to strike down an entire statute in response to a facia! attack when
potential difficulties can be remedied in future cases through fact-specific as-applied challenges.
Hilton. 167 F.3d at 71. Whatever overbreadth may exist at the edges of a statute is more
appropriately cured through a case-by-case evaluation of the facts in a given case. New York
State Club Assn.. Inc, v. City of New York. 487 U.S. 1, 14(1988). The fact that there is an
inherent difficulty in determining whether a person “appears to be” either seventeen or eighteen
years old does not render the definition overbroad. Hilton, 167 F.3d at 73. The apparent age of a
pre-pubescent child can easily be established through objective proof id
Furthermore, it is extremely unlikely that pro.secutions for sale or possession of images of
youthful looking adults on the cusp of majority would comprise a substantial portion of the
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prosecutions under the CPPA. Hilton. 167 F.3d at 73. Congress, based on the substantial 
evidence of expert opinions, determined that the demand driving the child pornography market is 
primarily for depictions of pre-pubescent children, which are images falling far from any 
constitutional protection. 1^ Thus, it is Congress’ intention to thwart purveyors of child 
pornography that cater to pedophiles, who by definition have a predilection for pre-pubertal 
children. Sen. Rpt. 104-358. at §§ IV(A), (C), Relying on Congress’ factual predictions, it is 
most likely that the vast majority of prosecutions under the “appears to be a minor’ provision 
would involve images of pre-pubescent children who otherwise clearly appear to be under the 
age of eighteen, Hilton. 167F.3dat74, The possibility of a few conceivably impermissible 
applications of the CPPA, such as prosecution for possessing sexual explicit material of adults 
who appear to be children, does not warrant condemnation of the statute as a whole. See Id, The 
appropriate remedy is reversal of an unconstitutional conviction should the circumstance arise, 
not invalidation of the entire statute based on hypothetical abstractions, id.
Moreover, the CPPA does not pose substantial problems of overbreadth sufficient to 
justify overturning the judgment of the lawmaking branch of our government When dealing 
with a federal statute challenged as overbroad, a federal court has an obligation to construe the 
statute so as to avoid constitutional problems. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 767. The Court s obligation 
to exercise independent judgment when First Amendment rights are implicated is not a license 
to replace Congress’ factual predictions with its own. Rather, it is to assure that, in formulating 
its judgments. Congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence. Turner 
Broadcastimt. 520 U.S. at 596. Congress, through the Senate Committee, heard substantial 
evidence on the harm to be avoided and the remedial measures to be adopted. Congress 
articulated a compelling interest, protection of children, that is served by the CPPA, and
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3 The compellint; interest in preventing the pernicious secondary effects of 
child pornography is sufficient to justify the expansion of federal child 
pornography law to prohibit virtual imaues.
In finding the CPPA to be unconstitutionally overbroad, the Ninth Circuit’s primary 
reason was that the CPPA no longer focused its justification on the harm to children. Free 
Speech. 198 F.3d at 1089. In so doing, the Ninth Circuit erroneously concluded that when 
outlawing “visual depictions” that “appear to be of a minor engaged in sexually explicit 
conduct,” the CPPA of 1996 impermissibly changed course Id The Ninth Circuit reasoned that 
because the justification cited by Congress in passing the CPPA included reference to its impact 
on the viewer, that the CPPA was necessarily banning speech based solely on its content. Id at 
1091. The perceived shift in the regulatory direction from defining child pornography in terms 
of the harm inflicted upon real children to a determination that child pornography is evil in and 
of itself, whether or not produced with real children, is the basis of the constitutional challenge 
made by the FSC
However, the flaw in this reasoning is revealed when considered in conjunction with the 
broadly permissive justifications for allowing Congress to outlaw child pornography approved 
by this Court in Ferber and Osborne. Congress and the states are “entitled to greater leeway in 
the regulation of pornographic depictions of children ” Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756. It is beyond 
question that “the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a
narrowly tailored the CPPA to that purpose. It is clear that the outlawing of “cyber” child
pornography is intended to, and will, protect “real” children from exploitation and harm. The
statutory definitions, together with Congress’ statements in the legislative record, provide a
precise and limited understanding of the “appears to be” language, which this Court should use
to fashion the controlling interpretation of the CPPA.
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government objective of surpassing importance.” Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757. It is important to 
keep in mind, however, that protection of the actual child exploited to produce a particular 
image is not the sole justification for the criminalization of child pornography. Osborne, 495 
U.S. at 111. In Osborne, this Court reasoned that the “gravity of the State’s interests in this 
context,” including the use of child pornography in the seduction of children, justified a ban on 
possession of child pornography, id. Thus, this Court explicitly recognized that prevention of 
child exploitation is a compelling interest that need not be limited to protection of children used 
to create child pornography, and essentially carved out a unique constitutional treatment for 
child pornography law in general. In passing the CPPA of 1996, Congress fashioned the law in 
accordance with the justifications previously approved by this Court. The CPPA s expansion of 
the prohibited materials to include those that might not in fact be images of actual children does 
not, as the Ninth Circuit incorrectly surmised, derive its authority from a compelling 
government interest in protecting “cyber” children. Rather, Congress desire to ban virtual 
child pornography was based on a factual determination that all child pornography, virtual or 
“real,” has the potential to harm actual children at some point in the chain of its production and
use.
It is uncontested that to the extent the CPPA criminalizes visual representations of 
“actual” minors engaged in sexual conduct, it falls squarely within the parameters established by 
Ferber and Osborne. The compelling interests in deterring direct abuse of children and 
destroying the illicit child pornography trade amply justify steps to expand the criminalization 
of images to include those of “virtual” as well as actual children, PcB^rl, 89 F, Supp. 2d at 
1245. In addition, the sheer impossibility of determining whether an image is “actual” or 
“virtual” warrants a prohibition of both. This is especially clear in light of two prominent
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consequences of not doing so: First, if virtual images are not prohibited, technologically savvy 
pedophiles could use computers to alter images of actual children in ways that obscure the true 
identity of the “actual” child and make it akin to a “virtual” image. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at § IV. 
Thus, any pedophile with a computer and readily available off-the-shelf software can efficiently 
subvert a child pornography law that only prohibits images of verifiably real children. Id 
Second, the harm inflicted on American children is real, regardless of whether the images that 
look real are only virtual images. Id The very existence of a market for such realistic images is 
the source of harm to our children, because pedophiles can use child pornography to seduce 
children into abusive situations Our interest in eradicating child pornography should not be any 
less powerful in instances where actual children are not used in the production of an image 
simply because the harm will accrue later in time.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioners respectfully request that this Court REVERSE the 
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on the questions of the 
constitutionality of the statutory language “appears to be” and “conveys the impression.
Respectfully submitted.
Counsel for Petitioners
32
